BOX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Get our own houses in order: The United States and Europe face internal challenges to democracy. In the United States, these go beyond the rhetoric and actions from Trump attacking independent media and undermining nonpartisan institutions. They include campaign finance, voter disenfranchisement, rights for minority populations, gerrymandering, and a hyper-partisan media environment. In the EU, democratic backsliding, weakening rule of law, and decreasing freedom for media and civil society are occurring in member states such as Hungary and Poland. The Biden administration will need to work hard to heal societal divisions and correct structural problems at home, but at the same time it should support the EU in its efforts to ensure its member states respect rule of law standards and civil liberties, which the Trump administration has generally not done. Meanwhile, the EU needs to develop a whole-of-society approach to strengthening democracy and support civil society in member states. It must also be willing to apply rule of law conditionality for future EU funding or launch infringement procedures against backsliding member states such as Hungary and Poland, recognizing that the union’s own credibility is ultimately at stake.
Develop a joint anti-corruption and anti-kleptocracy initiative: The United States and the EU need to strengthen their approach to countering corruption and kleptocracy at home and globally. This work begins with closing legal and tax loopholes for offshore and shell companies, closing illicit tax havens, strengthening beneficial ownership transparency, and beefing up anti–money laundering efforts. It also includes sharing more information and intelligence about illicit money flows, aligning their investment-screening legislations, and coordinating on sanctions and enforcement. The launch of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office offers an opportunity to ramp up enforcement cooperation with the United States.
Double down on assisting Belarus: The political situation in Belarus is of great concern to the transatlantic community and requires a joint response. For the EU, it is a test case for whether the European Commission can act more “geopolitically,” as von der Leyen has called for, with a mixed track record so far. Belarus’s case also highlights the lack of robust U.S. engagement, which in turn makes it harder for the EU to take the initiative. The Biden administration should reach out to the EU and coordinate a more ambitious response including further sanctions on Belarusian officials responsible for cracking down on peaceful protests. Other areas where joint action (including the United Kingdom) is essential include supporting Belarusian civil society and independent media, promoting a national dialogue in Belarus under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and supporting the Belarusian people.
Coordinate more on sanctions policy: While the EU and the United States have continued coordinating their sanctions policies with regard to cases such as Ukraine and Belarus during Trump’s presidency, the trend of “weaponizing” extraterritorial sanctions (particularly in the wake of the Trump administration’s decision to exit the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran) has had a negative impact on transatlantic cooperation, spurring a European desire to weaken the United States’ sanctions clout. A more coordinated approach with the Biden administration could help alleviate some of these tensions. Moreover, the introduction of the EU Magnitsky Law provides new opportunities for the two sides (together with Canada and the United Kingdom) to synchronize sanctions against human rights abusers—such as those in Russia, China, Myanmar, or Venezuela—in the form of travel restrictions and blocking of assets. The newly established EU-U.S. strategic dialogue on China could offer a useful platform to also coordinate more generally on human rights issues pertaining to the country.
Establish a joint global democracy fund: Although the coronavirus pandemic will focus attention on domestic issues and could lead to cuts in foreign aid, it is essential that the EU and the United States do not drop the ball on global democracy assistance efforts. As leading donors, they should also seek to coordinate their efforts more. One option is to establish a new jointly administrated investment fund for providing technical assistance to democracy support and civil society activities worldwide.
Develop shared standards for surveillance tech: Long-standing concerns about U.S. government surveillance—such as those that followed the Snowden scandal in 2013—have propelled the EU to develop tougher privacy standards such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Concerns about U.S. practices were also behind a high-profile ruling by the European Court of Justice in July 2020 that resulted in the invalidation of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield agreement. Meanwhile, China’s digital authoritarian model and growing export of its surveillance technology represents a fundamental challenge to competition, privacy, and liberal democracy for the transatlantic partners, requiring a joint effort to establish global standards for digital surveillance. As part of a new transatlantic trade and technology framework, the EU and the United States should work together with like-minded partners such as Japan to present a liberal democratic alternative to China’s state surveillance model. They should also cooperate on export-control restrictions for surveillance technology (for example, facial-recognition software and spyware) to China and other authoritarian regimes. The recent EU rules on the sale and export of digital surveillance technologies are a welcome step that should be coordinated with similar U.S. legislation.
Encourage more democracy cooperation by parliaments: Legislative bodies on both sides of the Atlantic play an important role in supporting global democracy and human rights efforts. During the Trump administration, Congress’s role in protecting federal funding has been particularly important, while the European Parliament plays an increasingly activist role on human rights. New initiatives like the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China—which includes members of the U.S. Congress, the European Parliament, and national European parliaments—has pushed governments to hold China’s government more accountable for upholding human rights in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Additional transatlantic legislative efforts such as joint letters, hearings, and dialogues on human rights issues should be encouraged.
Defend elections and push back against disinformation: The United States and the EU have experienced interference in their elections and the threat from disinformation. While they have taken significant steps to upgrade their preparedness in recent years, there is still a need for more shared goals and implementing a joint strategy for deterring adversaries such as Russia and China from interfering in elections. Part of the answer lies in joint approaches to regulating online platforms for hate speech and disinformation. Moreover, the EU and the United States should seek to engage social-media influencers to help protect against disinformation on a voluntary basis. The EU should immediately approach the Biden administration about its new European Democracy Action Plan and the Digital Services Act and explore if both sides can shape a shared approach to content moderation and counter-disinformation, especially given evolving debates in the United States on these issues. Some of these conversations could ideally take place within the framework of a new EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council, bringing together officials and private sector representatives from both sides of the Atlantic.
Rally the world’s democracies: Biden has called for a Summit for Democracy to revive democratic collaboration. The EU and the United States should collaborate on preparing this summit and should form a joint working group in order to ensure it will have a clear agenda and concrete objectives. It is essential that such a summit include nongovernmental organizations, civil society representatives, media representatives, and technology companies. The EU and the United States should also consider other ways of bringing together democratic countries around particular initiatives—such as the United Kingdom’s proposed D-10 format or within the existing G7 format to help promote democratic standards for technology. There is also an opportunity to reach out and forge new democracy partnerships between the EU, the United States, and other like-minded countries around the world such as in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
Counter authoritarian influence in international organizations: China is increasingly asserting its influence in international organizations with the goal of influencing and eroding their liberal principles. It also seeks to leverage multilateral institutions to shape norms and advance its own foreign policy interests. China is courting countries in Africa, the Pacific, and elsewhere through leveraged loans, economic assistance packages, and diplomatic outreach to form an influential voting bloc in the UN. To counter this sort of malign authoritarian influence in the multilateral system, the Trump administration’s unilateralism and disengagement was counterproductive. What is needed is a joint transatlantic effort to rally like-minded countries to advance practical and targeted reform proposals that can help shore up the multilateral system and address malign authoritarian influence by ensuring greater accountability, transparency, and respect for the rule of law in international organizations.