Stepping in before all hell breaks loose

Stepping in before all Hell Breaks Loose: Introductory Remarks to the Parliamentary Dialogue on Pillar II of the Responsibility to Protect

Introductory Remarks to the Parliamentary Dialogue on Pillar II of the Responsibility to Protect

On December 11th, the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) organized a conference on the implementation of Pillar II of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, White & Case LLP and the Heinrich Boell Foundation North America. The event convened experts in the field, UN officials and parliamentarians from Brazil, Paraguay, Tanzania, Belgium and Germany to discuss how parliamentarians can contribute to the implementation of peer-to-peer-assistance mechanisms under Pillar II of the Responsibility to Protect.

Pillar II of the Responsibility to Protect stipulates that “the international community has a commitment to provide assistance to States in building capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”[1]

Genocide and mass atrocities do not occur out of the blue. Thanks to an abundance of research, we can now identify many early warning signs of mass atrocities before all hell breaks loose. Mass atrocities are often committed in failed or failing states, characterized by the collapse of the institutional, social and normative order. In such environments, the erosion of the fundamental rules of our co-existence unleashes the darkest side of the human spirit. Not in all cases, however, are governments unable to protect their citizens from mass atrocities. In some cases, they are unwilling to do so, and mass killings are driven not by state collapse but by ideological fanaticism or ruthless battles for political power.

In both cases, mass atrocities are not an unavoidable consequence of archaic hatred between rival groups. Most of the time, they take place in states with ineffective, illegitimate, and exclusive governance, weak security forces, a lack of a functioning justice system and a lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms. One current example of the correlation between governance failure and the perpetration of mass atrocities is, of course, Iraq, where the sectarian government of former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki drove part of the marginalized Sunni population into the arms of ISIS. With no inclusive vision for the future of all Iraqi citizens, the divisive, corrupt Iraqi government and their central security forces were incapable of winning this fight.

Just across the border, the repressive nature of the Syrian regime of Bashar al Assad undoubtedly contributed to popular resentment against the regime, cumulating in the initially peaceful popular demonstrations in 2011. But in contrast to the case of Iraq, the mass atrocities perpetrated by Assad’s army are acts of clear intent rather than of government failure or a weak state. Bashar al Assad is determined to cling to power, no matter the costs in human lives, and there seems no end in sight even as we are approaching the 4th annual commemoration of the beginning of the Syrian uprising.

Of course, every conflict, and every case of mass atrocity perpetration is different, and there cannot be any blue print solutions. In fact, we are faced with so many crises of different nature that no state and no narrow coalition of the willing alone can claim to be able to “fix” the problem. Given the daunting scope of today’s threats to peace and security, it is both timely and necessary for us to discuss today what the international community can do before a conflict becomes so intractable that no one has the political will, the capacity or the necessary stamina to successfully intervene.

The UN Secretary General’s report on the responsibilities of the international community under Pillar II lays out a framework to help the international community to do just that: engage with states and civil society through preventative diplomacy, capacity building, and concrete assistance to protect a state’s population before mass atrocities are committed. This is a much needed framework since prevention certainly remains the most underdeveloped and least debated part of R2P.

Given the discouraging or at least mixed track record of the major military intervention of the past decade, I believe that this is a window of opportunity for the international community to focus on conflict prevention. Most of the populations in the West are now deeply wary of military interventions and disillusioned by the effects of externally-enforced regime change. Limits of military interventions without a political overall framework have become bluntly apparent in different types of intervention, most drastically in Iraq and Libya. Against this backdrop, I hope we can shed some light today on how to further strengthen the implementation of Pillar II with the help of parliamentarians worldwide.

Focusing on Pillar II and the role of the international community in the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide seems even more crucial as Pillar III interventions have become increasingly unlikely in the wake of the experiences in Libya, the stalemate over the conflict in Syria, and a deteriorating climate between the US and Russia. Nevertheless, I am urging us to hold this meeting with those victims in mind that are suffering from these crimes today- in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan and other places. No matter how intractable these conflicts have become, and how divided the international community is over the appropriate response- we cannot afford to give up on the affected communities. What it takes to overcome the failure of the international community to live up to its responsibility to protect is another question for another time though, and I look forward to continuing this discussion with our wonderful partners in the future.

For the full conference report, please click here.

 

[1] Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary General, Jan. 2009 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/677