NATO’s Defense and Deterrence Posture Review – A Missed Opportunity?

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American Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs) currently forward deployed in five Europe countries - have always been endowed with a symbolic value that far outweighs their strategic importance. It was therefore not surprising that NATO’s Defense and Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) discreetly published at the Chicago Summit concluded that in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities is a sound one.

Although few had expected anything different, the low profile of the whole nuclear issue and the question of NATO’s future overall defense and deterrence posture is remarkable because not only was the review originally intended a prominent place on the Chicago agenda, but there seem never to have been a better time to review the role of nuclear weapons in the Atlantic Alliance.

To be sure a deterrence and defense posture review was never on NATO’s wish list. The issue was forced onto the Alliance agenda at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 as a last ditch at securing consensus for the Strategic Concept. Much to the consternation of some allies, the topic had been introduced by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle within the heady atmosphere of President Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech and in the middle of the preparations for the Strategic Concept. Since then NATO has discussed a number of issues related to its defense and deterrence posture, most notably the future of the NSNWs. However, the forward deployed nuclear weapons have always been an extremely sensitive issue in NATO, and over the past 18 months it has become clear that the Allies are still divided on nuclear issues and would prefer not to talk about them at all. Indeed the decision to publish the DDPR document was only taken immediately prior to the Chicago Summit.

Raising the question of the role of nuclear weapons that most agree are strategically irrelevant was of course a perfectly reasonable thing to do. Moreover from a pragmatic perspective, a decision on the future of the approximate 180 B61 gravity bombs would have to be taken as the German dual-capable aircraft assigned to carry the NSNWs to their targets, will be replaced with Eurofighters that are unlikely to be made nuclear capable. Decisions about the future of dual-capable aircraft in the other host countries are also looming. In addition the B61s will need to be modernized if they are to be kept in service beyond the next decade and the recent intrusion by activists at the Kleine Brogel base in Belgium raises serious issues about the security at the European hosting sites, which will have to be addressed. Perhaps most importantly, the time for reviewing NATO’s nuclear posture is right because the agreement at Lisbon to adopt a missile defense, will alter NATO’s overall deterrence and defense posture and will offer new opportunities for risk and burden sharing. Moreover, the DDPR has been formulated precisely at the time where it is becoming clear that the transatlantic bargain as established in the aftermath of the Second World War will have to be renegotiated. America’s ‘pivot towards Asia’ and changing global power constellations will require Allies to seriously rethink how the transatlantic relationship will be maintained in the years to come. In particular new ways of showing commitment, both on the American and the European side of the Atlantic will have to be developed.

In other words, there was plenty for NATO to ‘review’ in the DDPR and the initiative seemed an excellent opportunity to address all the above issues and placing the issues high on the NATO agenda was an entirely logical thing to do. Yet in doing so Westerwelle effectively ‘put a cat amongst the NATO pigeons’, which has left the Alliance in a serious predicament ever since.

The DDPR – like clapping with one hand

Despite the clear need for a decision to change the long established nuclear practice, and to determine what constitutes an ‘appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defense forces’ the DDPR merely endorsed the current mix, but failed to ask – ‘appropriate for what’?

Unfortunately it seems that with the DDPR process, the Alliance has merely gone through the requested process, but has actually failed to deliver anything of substance – in other words NATO has been ‘clapping with one hand’. The document effectively dodges the main issues and fails completely to answer some of the most essential questions – most notably:

• What is the purpose of nuclear weapons – especially the forward deployed NSNWs?
• How has that purpose changed since the end of the Cold War?
• What is the effect of the new missile defence capability for the overall defence and deterrence posture?
• In which other ways might NATO be able to share the responsibility of possible nuclear use
• In which other ways might the United States be able to show continued commitment to the defence of Europe

In addition the document never asks what the implications are of NATO’s decision at Lisbon to elevate ‘cooperative security’ and ‘crisis management’ to core tasks along with ‘collective defence’. Despite the significant changes brought about by the Strategic Concept, the DDPR reads as if none of those changes matter. This includes the significant change in the Strategic Concept in relation to cooperative security, which was partly envisaged to be achieved through a new improved relationship with Russia.It is particularly problematic that the DDPR frames Russia more as a potential enemy than as a potential cooperation partner. In practice the construction of Russia as a potential enemy and the fact that the DDPR makes withdrawal of NATO’s NSNWs contingent on reciprocal Russian measures means that the Alliance has restricted its room of manoeuvre considerably.  This is especially so as Russia has made it clear that it will not discuss NSNWs until all forward deployed weapons have been removed from Europe. However, as NATO has already removed about 90 per cent of the weapons unilaterally, the 180 or so remaining B61s hardly constitute a good bargaining position against the more than 2000 Russian NSNWs.

As an additional twist to an already rather bizarre process, the document endorses the status quo despite the fact that the status quo cannot possibly be maintained. The problem is that even though agreement to changing NATO’s NSNWs posture could not be agreed in the DDPR, it is likely that NATO’s nuclear capability nevertheless will change. There exists a very real risk of a disorderly process of national nuclear disarmament when some deployment countries decide not to replace their existing dual-capable aircraft (DCA) with other DCAs. Germany seems certain not to make its planned Eurofighters nuclear capable, which effectively will mean that Germany will no longer host the forward deployed NSNWs. Moreover once there is a German (default) decision on withdrawal of its B61s, Holland and Belgium are likely to follow. In other words despite the absence of an over all NATO decision on the future of NSNWs, the likely outcome is disarmament by default.

At the same time, the DDPR surreptitiously endorsed modernization of the B61 gravity bombs. The DDPR states that it will ’ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure and effective’. What this basically means is that the existing B61 gravity bombs will undergo a costly life extension programme, which will upgrade the capability considerably by changing the bombs into precision-guided weapons. So in parallel with disorderly nuclear disarmament, the DDPR may also bring about nuclear escalation by default. The overall effect of modernization of DCA to include Joint Strike Fighter armed with modernized precision-guided B61s will constitute a considerable up-grade.

A missed opportunity

This is all very disappointing and constitutes a missed opportunity of staggering proportions. The original intention with the DDPR was a short-term goal of securing agreement on the Strategic Concept, a medium-term goal of producing a statement that would reflect Alliance consensus on deterrence and defense issues, and a longer-term goal of establishing new practices of burden and risk sharing and demonstration of commitment. As it stands now it seems that NATO has only achieved the first goal as the second goal is only achieved in the sense that a document has been produced as promised – but it is a document with no substance, whilst the long-term goal has not even been addressed, suggesting that Allies were not able to agree to new ways of ensuring nuclear sharing and possible alternatives such as sharing of missile defense and the value of burden-sharing through practical participation in the other two core tasks; crisis management and cooperative security. This is a shame because such a re-think could have been part and parcel of the needed reformulation of the transatlantic bargain.

The current situation therefore is that despite the publication of the DDPR, the Alliance is no closer to agreement on the role of nuclear weapons, on who or what is to be deterred and how to demonstrate commitment and sharing of risks and burdens in the strategic environment of the 21st century. One of the best things that can be said about the DDPR is that it seems not to have closed the discussion but promises to continue to adjust Alliance strategy and to continue to revise relevant Alliance policies in light of strategic developments and trends in the international security environment. Yet, although the DDPR opens up for a continuation of adjustments in NATO’s defense and deterrence posture, the document has painted the Alliance into a corner that makes it difficult to see what next steps NATO might be able to take and when NATO will next have the opportunity to forge a deterrence and defense posture that really is fit for the 21st century.

It is especially problematic that the DDPR has restricted NATO’s room of maneuver by making withdrawal contingent on Russian reciprocal moves. Such reciprocal moves are very unlikely unless NATO takes the first step by relocating the forward deployed nuclear weapons back to the United States. It is also problematic to identify a next step because, although the official line from NATO is that the DDPR shows Alliance unity, the DDPR has actually divided NATO into two camps – for and against withdrawal. Undoing this division is not going to be easy – but it is a precondition for moving ahead in a constructive manner.

Looking ahead

Within the parameters of DDPR, NATO’s best option seems to be to return to some of the recommendations of the Non-paper submitted in April last year by Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands. As a first step NATO should seek increased transparency with Russia on numbers, types, locations, operational status and level of storage security. These are questions that could usefully be addressed in the NATO-Russia Council.  Moreover, a renewed effort at reaching an understanding with Russia on cooperation on missile defense would – if reasonably successful – provide an environment that would be more conducive for further discussions within NATO on NSNWs.

Most importantly however, now that the restrictive DDPR process is over, which effectively was controlled by the national delegations and in which NATO’s international staff played a marginal role and in which the United States refrained from asserting its influence, it is now time for NATO to start a real internal dialogue and analysis based on a holistic approach to the overarching question -  ’deter whom, how and from what’ and what is the role of NATO’s NSNWs and why exactly does NATO still need them?

Only a few Allies hold up the process for change and some of them may do so because they have never taken part in the traditional Alliance approach to nuclear questions, in which the United States provided firm, but patient, leadership towards an Alliance nuclear posture that fitted the overall strategic environment and which supported overarching policy goal – such as reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and a ’reset’ relationship with Russia. In other words, it is time for the US to take the lead and to seek to influence the position of those allies who still see NSNWs as essential.  Realistically, the European Allies are unlikely to agree to any substantial change unless either prodded by an existential crisis or unless some very clear leadership is exercised by the US. So NATO needs to get back to its traditional way of dialogue and persuasion under American leadership, where new Allies are taught about nuclear matters in the way that the ’Old’ Allies were during the Cold War.

This text is based on a presentation Trine Flockhardt gave at the Annual Meeting of the Arms Control Association on 5 June 2012 in Washington DC. The conference was co-hosted by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America.