hbs: Since you were first elected as MEP in 2009, the composition of the Parliament has changed quite significantly. How does the growing influence of populist groups in the Parliament change your work considering that some of those parties put the whole European project into question?
Reinhard Bütikofer: Well, an important fact that everybody should know about those populist MEPs is this: they don’t take their parliamentary work seriously. Take Mr. Farage, the leader of UKIP, for example. He comes to a plenary session, gives a speech and addresses his domestic audience from the platform of the European Parliament. So does Marine Le Pen from France, representing the Front National, and many other populist representatives. They use European taxpayers’ money not to deal with the issues the Parliament is supposed to deal with – legislation, controlling the European Commission and all that. Instead, they use it as a well-paid propaganda platform. Sometimes that goes far beyond all red lines. We have a very exceptional Polish Parliamentarian, for example, who has advocated for the death penalty and talked about “Niggers” in the European Parliament. We also have a Member who was so extreme that even Marine Le Pen rejected him because he was openly opposing female suffrage.
hbs: One of the explanations for the rise of populist parties refers to the widespread disillusion with traditional political parties. Why haven’t the Greens been more successful in positioning themselves as a real alternative for a sustainable, diverse and equitable Europe?
Well there is no one answer to that question. We have tried to run a common campaign during the last election for the European Parliament. We elected two common campaign leaders and we agreed on one common manifesto for all the parties that run. Still, individual Green parties ran their campaigns under their own premises, and some of our parties have been more successful than others. There were some positive results for the Greens, e.g. in Sweden, Austria and Luxembourg. Other Green parties returned weaker results, most notably the French. The Germans also fell back a bit, partially because of a change in the electoral law. So it was a mixed bag for the Greens overall, and you can’t give one conclusive answer for everybody. But clearly in some countries in crisis where populist parties are thriving, the Greens have not been able to take deep roots. Then again, look at another very interesting more recent example, which is the Green Party of England and Wales. A year ago they had 12.000 members, today they have 52.000. They are now being considered a relevant party for the first time since many years. Part of their success is that they strictly and explicitly position themselves as an alternative and opposition to UKIP. When UKIP tries to create a xenophobic narrative, the Greens go against that more clearly than anybody else. Similarly, in Austria the Greens were the one political force that most distinctly opposed the FPÖ – the rightwing radical party. So you see: it has been done and it can be done, but of course it also forces Green parties to tackle issues that are of relevance for those voters that are disgruntled. And sometimes the shortcoming may be that some of our Green parties prefer to stick to the topics they know rather than to address the topics the voter want to know about. If you don’t address the issues the voters are keen on learning about, why should they vote for you?
hbs: The success of SYRIZA in Greece was overwhelming - PODEMOS, Sinn Fein and other radical left parties may follow. Simultaneously, right-wing movements like Front National, UKIP and PEGIDA have been thriving. In Greece, the elections have led to a right-left coalition. Is our traditional understanding of a linear political spectrum still relevant in the European context?
The first good news is: PEGIDA is not thriving, it is falling apart. And they never resonated much outside of Dresden and Leipzig. So don’t overestimate that. There are of course issues which are being shared by right-wing populist and left-wing populist, even though I still don’t believe you should treat them as the offspring of the same source. For instance, you sometimes hear some xenophobic voices from left-wing populist, but it’s not the general rule. Conversely, it is the rule with right-wing populist. You may have some anti-Semitic voices even with left-wing radical groups, but again it’s not the general rule. Also, anti-Muslim mobilization can mostly be found with right-wing populist. There are some distinctions that are not irrelevant. However, they also share some clear antagonism against the established political system. In a way, populists are successful in lending themselves as a voice to those who feel that the system is failing them. Most Green parties would find it very difficult to position themselves in that corner, because what we advocate for is normally reformist policies, using the institutions to promote our green agenda. In Germany we are represented in eight, soon to be nine out of 16 state governments. More than half of the German citizens are being governed on a regional level by Greens. If that’s the case – and in Austria it’s similar – you cannot position yourself as an anti-system party. That just wouldn’t convince anybody.
hbs: Do you believe that the Greek election is a game changer for the European Union? If so, are you more concerned or hopeful regarding this watershed moment for Europe?
It’s hard to make prediction, particularly when they concern the future. Many people put a lot of hope into this SYRIZA victory because a lot of people believe – and I share that belief, even though I am not a big fan of SYRIZA – that we have to turn the tide and get away from the predominant austerity orientation of economic policy in Europe. We have to change the paradigm and instead of chasing austerity under the illusion that somehow you can shrink yourself into growth, we have to go for investment. And a lot of people hoped that a change of majority in Greece would be a Europe-wide signal in that direction. As far as I can tell right now, that’s not what is happening with SYRIZA. SYRIZA have put themselves in a corner, they have antagonized a lot of actors on the European level that they should have tried to win over. So far all I can see is that they are trying to brand their policies more as an expression of national Greek interest in opposition to the Germans and the Brussels elites and everybody outside of Greece who is somehow responsible for everything that’s going wrong in Greece. That narrative is not a fair rendition of what really happened. Instead, they should have focused on trying to draft a platform for change and hope that would be open to other European actors. And it’s interesting to note that PODEMOS are now distancing themselves from SYRIZA. Just a few days ago they were marching arm in arm, and now PODEMOS says ‘look, we are different from them’. That may serve as an indicator that SYRIZA are mishandling their situation.
hbs: SYRIZA challenges the political and economic status quo. In the mainstream German debate, however, austerity is still perceived as without an alternative. Do you see Chancellor Merkel becoming increasingly isolated in her take on this debate?
I have said publicly many times that I think there must be a shift away from austerity, so in that regard I would want to see our German Finance Minister Schӓuble isolated. But what I see is just the opposite. He plays a very arrogant role vis-à-vis Greece and for too long was not being repudiated by his colleagues. Instead, he seems to be cheering the European caucus against the Greek government. That said, I want to make one additional point: First, it would be unfair to characterize the situation in Greece as merely the outcome of austerity policies. There were some homemade problems in Greece – domestic problems – aggravated by rampant corruption by both major parties over many decades. Second, there still is a need for reforms. But we should make a very clear distinction between reforms and austerity. Economic reforms can be necessary and positive, e.g. when facilitating a transition towards a low-carbon economy, which is the core of our Green New Deal policy. Austerity just says “let’s not spend what we don’t have”. But every businessman knows that if you don’t invest into new activities, into new products, into new policies, if you just cut down, it’s not possible to make a turn-around. The three major challenges in Greece before and after the elections have been: get rid of austerity; alleviate the debt burden; and enact effective reforms. SYRIZA has focused so far exclusively on the first two and has not yet indicated what they intend to do on reforms. It remains to be seen whether they will pick that up, because to grow the economy and the social welfare system, and to reestablish what Greece lost over the last years, reforms are needed as well.
hbs: Strong ties between leading members of SYRIZA and ANEL to the Kremlin have raised concerns in many European capitals. Do we face increasing disunity in Europe in formulating a response to the war in Ukraine and the EU’s relations to Russia?
Europe has not progressed because we always were united on everything, but because when we had crises and we had a lack of harmony and when we had different point of views, we managed to muddle through and find new solutions based on compromise. Describing different points of departure is just the first step of the European process, and it’s neither new nor is it terribly bad. Greece is not the only country that takes a different attitude towards Russia than let’s say the Baltic States or Poland. There is Austria, there is Slovakia, there is the Czech Republic, there is Hungary, there is Bulgaria… The interesting fact is that in spite of all these different points of departure, the European family has stood together and still stands together. The Greek government after first alienating a couple of people by utterances that sounded very strange to my ears, too, in the end came around and supported the prolongation of the sanctions. So I will judge them by what they do rather than by what they say.
hbs: In case we will face the GREXIT and Greece will need financial support, will they look for aid in Moscow? What would be the consequence in terms of Russian influence in Europe?
First or all, GREXIT is not an option. Second, even if it was, turning to Moscow for help would not be a good option for Athens. The Cypriots tried. Before the Cypriot government accepted the EU bailout, they turned to the Russians and asked what their conditions would be. After considering them, they came back to Brussels and negotiated with the EU. Take that as a hint.
hbs: Thank you for your time.