With the second meeting of the Transitional Committee (TC) concluded end of May, just days before the start of the UNFCCC session in Bonn, the deliberative technical process to develop recommendations for the operationalization of new funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage, and in particular advancing modalities for a Loss and Damage Fund (LDF), is now at a critical halfway point. As the focus in Bonn shifted from broad stroke, big picture declarations to more granular substantive line sketching, a middle ground picture aligning developing and developed countries’ visions of the possible TC process outcomes to be presented for adoption at COP28 in Dubai in November remains elusive.
The contours of the competing and seemingly incompatible proposals of the two country constituencies are now more clearly outlined. Discussions in the second Glasgow Dialogue during the Bonn intersessional negotiations largely confirmed and reinforced countries’ positions, although they opened up the discourse to a much broader group of parties and non-party stakeholders, as the much more restrictive TC process with its limited country representation and stakeholder participation modalities allowed for. With only two more TC meetings to go (see the figure below on the time line and process activities related to the TC’s mandate), details of the draft recommendations to the COP28 are expected to form the center of deliberations already at the TC’s next meeting at the end August, before they have to be agreed by consensus at the body’s fourth and last meeting in October.
- establish institutional arrangements, modalities, structure, governance and terms of reference for a new Loss and Damage Fund (LDF);
- define the elements of the new funding arrangements;
- identify and expand sources of funding; and
- ensure coordination and complementarity with existing funding arrangements.
Going into the Bonn meeting, TC Co-Chairs Richard Sherman (South Africa) and Outi Honkatukia (Finland) had issued a scenario note with a detailed set of guiding questions to direct the discourse on those four interrelated design elements. This pushed TC members, as well as civil society observers, in their interventions to go into more specifics, clearly outline their respective priorities and ‘must haves’ as well as delineate ‘bare minimums’ and red lines.
While there were of course individual country nuances with specific arrangement details, broadly speaking country representatives’ views aligned largely with respective developed and developing country constituency approaches, with very little specifics as of yet on what a ‘bridging proposal’ could look like that would be acceptable to both country groups and able to garner the required consensus approval for recommendations to be forwarded to COP28 for consideration and approval by the COP and CMA.
Figure: Time line of mandated and relevant activities related to the TC mandate until COP28
Design elements of the LDF
Roughly a dozen detailed technical questions guided the discussions in Bonn on the design elements of the LDF, and thus what most developing countries as well as civil society observers following the process consider to be the heart of the TC’s mandate. They covered the legal implications for establishing the fund; what body it would be accountable to, how those accountability arrangements would be structured and how it could be periodically reviewed; eligibility to access its funding and possible funding windows; how it would be governed and administrated; and its role within broader new funding arrangements.
Stand alone or under an existing entity?
In their interventions, developing country TC members (including from Egypt, Timor-Leste, Zambia and the Dominican Republic ) made it clear that they see the LDF as a standalone fund serving as an operating entity of the UNFCCC financial mechanism and thus accountable to its parties and serving in the same function for the Paris Agreement. The LDF would therefore – similar to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Global Environment Facility (GEF) – receive annual guidance from both the COP and the CMA and be guided by the principles of the Convention, especially on equity (common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, CBDR-RC) and eligibility. The representatives from Antigua and Barbuda and the Maldives likewise urged a link to the COP, but foresaw a broader oversight function by the UN more generally for loss and damage funding arrangements, including the fund, such as either a role of the UN General Assembly or the UN Secretary General with a high-level coordinating mechanism.
In contrast, several developed country TC members (including from the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France and Canada) questioned the need to set up a standalone fund and pointed to the possibility to situate the LDF under an existing entity, such as the GCF or the GEF or even outside of the UNFCCC, arguing that it would speed up operationalization. Several cited the recent precedent of a decision under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to set up a new Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF) under the GEF as a model to consider, with France and Canada also suggesting that such an initial setup could be ‘transitional’ for an initial period of several years and subject to review.
Governance and legal personality
The position of TC members on the status of the LDF and where to situate it (stand alone or under an existing funding entity; under the UNFCCC or outside) determines the approach to a number of related questions, including on how the relationship between the fund and broader arrangements is set, how and by whom the fund would be reviewed and the process of the review, as well as legal implications for establishing the fund and its secretariat arrangements. The latter is inextricably tied to and dependent on the scope and modalities of the fund itself as is the choice of fund governance. While members from both constituencies support a fund board with shared governance arrangements and co-chairs from developed and developing countries, there is not yet agreement on a number of other LDF governance options. These include whether the LDF board should be based on equitable presentation (such as in the Adaptation Fund Board) including in a geographically balanced way (as argued by Timor-Leste and the Dominican Republic); ensuring Eastern European participation (a point stressed by Armenia) and with two designated seats each for least developed countries and small island developing states (as urged by Bhutan); and the extent to which other funds’ governance model should be considered for example with respect to including non-party voting seats following the example of the health-focused Global Fund (as pushed for by civil society representatives in their intervention and submission, but also brought up by the United States). The fund’s scope and modalities are also a consideration for whether its board would be a resident board or a periodically sitting one (a point stressed by the United Kingdom) as well if decision-making would be just based on consensus (mentioned as preferred approach by Antigua and Barbuda and the United States) or also allow for other options, such as voting, in the absence of consensus (as is possible for GCF project approvals). Related to this are also considerations of options for delegation and flexibility in decision-making, including to ensure speed for urgent responses (points raised by South Korea and the Maldives).
If the LDF is set up as a stand-alone fund under the Convention, it would need to have a legal personality and privileges and immunities (P&Is) to be able to conduct funding operations in recipient countries independent of recipient countries granting that status to the fund through individual bilateral agreements (something that the GCF is still struggling with) as well as its own independent secretariat. Several TC members (including from South Korea and Timor-Leste) urged autonomy for the LDF Secretariat. Alternatively, P&Is could also be conveyed through a set up under an existing entity, which could also provide secretariat services and functions, such as for example the GEF does for the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCFF) and will for the new GBFF.
Financial management and periodic review
Several speakers (including from Egypt, the United States and Canada) brought up the option of structuring the fund similarly to the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), with its own independent Board (which could still be elected by the COP/CMA), but drawing legal and management support from the World Bank and profiting from its financial capabilities (both in receiving funding from a wide variety of sources, including public, private, philanthropic or alternative ones such as monetized certified emissions rights, issued bonds or re-assigned special drawing rights and delivering finance in the form of multiple concessional and non-concessional financial instruments). As argued by Egypt, such a setup would presumably not structurally interfere with designating the LDF as an operating entity under the financial mechanism of the Convention and in serving in the same function under the Paris Agreement. In a much narrower purely financial management function, the World Bank already serves as trustee for several UNFCCC funds, including the GEF and GCF, and its designation as trustee for the LDF was deemed ‘inevitable’, not controversial, and one of the few areas of clear emerging convergence between developed and developing countries. The capacity of a fund to be ‘attractive’ for a variety of different sources of financial inputs (public, private, and/or philanthropic) was brought up by several developed country TC members (including Ireland, Japan and the United States) in this context.
On the need for and process of reviewing the LDF periodically, several developing country TC members (from Egypt, Bhutan, Timor-Leste and the Dominican Republic) pointed to the possibility of establishing an internal review function (through an independent evaluation unit such as at the GCF), as well as providing an external review via a link to and learning from existing COP/CMA review processes to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of the fund. This could include a potential alignment with the 5-year cycle of the Global Stocktake or tied to the periodic review of the Convention’s financial mechanism. Developed country TC members (from Ireland, France and Canada) also highlighted the need to periodically review the ‘business model’ of the fund to allow its adjustments to evolving needs, including with respect to scope and eligibility.
Purpose and scope of the LDF
Some of the biggest disagreements and competing visions between developed and developing country TC members manifested themselves in the discussion about the purpose and scope of the fund within the broader new loss and damage funding arrangements, the LDF’s possible thematic windows as well as its eligibility, access and funding delivery modalities.
As a ‘climate justice fund’ (Timor-Leste) meant to help developing countries regain development losses from climate change (Egypt), in the view of most developing country TC members the fund should comprehensively address losses and damages through short-, medium- and long-term response measures, including by focusing on recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction; securing livelihoods; and dealing with non-economic losses (NEL) and human mobility. It should provide funding through programmatic approaches, facilitate direct access and provide budgetary financial support through grant-based non-debt inducing public funding (Dominican Republic, Timor-Leste, Bhutan, Chile and Venezuela) in line with CBDR-RC and equity for all developing countries, including gender-responsiveness and protection of the most vulnerable people. The developing country TC member constituency has elaborated key considerations and recommendations for the fund in a submission to the TC. Many of these asks were echoed by civil society representatives in their contributions and interventions to the discourse in Bonn as well. Given this framing, developing country TC members see a leading and coordinating role for the LDF with respect to the broader new funding arrangements in which it would be the centerpiece.
Comprehensive, with distinct funding windows…
Based on this expectation for the comprehensive scope and core modalities of the LDF, several developing country TC members propose three distinct windows for the LDF, although with slightly different configurations regarding the timescales and respective foci of support. TC members from least developed countries (LDCs) in a submission to the TC outlined their expectation for a rapid response window in the immediate aftermath of extreme events, an intermediate window focused on rehabilitation and recovery, and a chronic needs window to address ongoing effects of slow onset events. Similarly the representative from Egypt called for a ‘T+1’ livelihood support window in the aftermath of extreme events following after short-term humanitarian relief ends, a medium- to long-term reconstruction window, and a window focused on slow-onset events. All developing country TC members speaking to this point during the Bonn meeting drew a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and funding to address loss and damage, indicating the dependence of the former on geopolitics and goodwill (as stressed by the Dominican Republic) instead of providing new and additional predictable funding as a matter of historic responsibility and climate justice to support developing countries with rehabilitation and reconstruction from extreme and slow onset events. Similarly, representatives from civil society, intervening in Bonn, propose a fund with comprehensive coverage and three windows initially, namely a fast/disaster response window, one covering medium to long efforts and responding to slow-onset events, but also a small-grant window directly accessible to affected local communities and population groups.
… or narrow, with other actors filling gaps?
In contrast, developed country TC members envision a much narrower scope and focus for the fund, limited to addressing ‘priority gaps’ in a way that is ‘fit for purpose’ (as stressed for example by the United States TC representative). Some of the priority gaps mentioned by developed country TC members in this regards were activities such as planning support for slow-onset events as well as non-economic losses, with a call to not duplicate or replace what already exists. They see the LDF as only one of many actors with a limited mandate under the new funding arrangements’ ‘mosaic of solutions’, which includes recent institutional mechanisms such as the Germany-led Global Shield initiative and other risk pooling mechanisms, UN agencies active in humanitarian response or addressing migration and the comprehensive set of multilateral, regional and bilateral development finance institutions. Representatives from the United States, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom emphasized in particular that the new fund should not provide funding in response to rapid onset events, pointing out that a strong system for humanitarian emergency support after extreme events already exists and that acknowledged resource gaps could be the focus of TC recommendations to its main actors to support anticipatory action and provide pre-arranged financing. They also stressed in particular the role of the World Bank and multilateral development banks (MDBs) in better integrating loss and damage into their activities, as well as in addressing current limited access to concessional finance based on income classification, not climate vulnerability, for example on reconstruction, and how MDBs could further expand the use of instruments such as climate-related debt deferment clauses.
Similarly, they seek to limit access to the fund to only those countries that they consider particularly vulnerable, mainly SIDS and LDCs. If successful, this would undermine the broader equity framing and related criterion for eligibility for financial support under the UNFCCC. Beyond the TC process, such a decision would have much broader implications for other climate finance relevant negotiations happening in parallel, in particularly the ongoing Global Stocktake and the push for more ambition (with many developing countries’ nationally determined contributions highlighting actions conditional on the provision of adequate financial support) as well as the determination of a new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) to be set by COP29 for funding support after 2025 (with an inclusion of funding provision mandates and/or a respective sub-goal for addressing loss and damage).
Elements of new funding arrangements
The discussions on defining elements of the new funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage, mandated by COP28 as a focus of the TC’s work, made it apparent that there is no clear or shared understanding of what this mandate encompasses. Several developing country TC members (from Bhutan, Timor-Leste, and Maldives) stressed the importance of action on debt, both by mobilizing and providing new, additional, and predictable, non-debt creating resources, as well as by including calls for comprehensive debt cancelation or debt relief as part of the recommendations that the TC needs to advance on new funding arrangements. Most TC members in their interventions on this agenda item focused primarily on the range of and types of actors (national and international and inside and outside of the UNFCCC) to include in these arrangements, and whether these are seen as complementing a new fund positioned centrally as the main multilateral finance mechanism for responding to loss and damage, or subsuming it as one of many actors without distinction within the evolving loss and damage finance architecture.
Accountability and authority
The envisioned multitude of actors in a ‘mosaic’ funding landscape raises the central question of how to ensure accountability and transparency in the new funding arrangements, as well as coordination, complementarity and coherence in the mobilization and provision of financing to address loss and damage. Here one core issue is which institution or mechanism could take on a coordinating function internationally and provide guidance to the larger group of actors. Some initial suggestions included that these functions could be taken up by the fund and/or a coordinating council under the UNFCCC (Egypt, Zambia, Timor-Leste), but also potentially the UN system more generally (the Dominican Republic) or even a high level coordinating mechanism under authority of the UN Secretary General specifically (Maldives). TC members from both developed and developing countries also mentioned an important role for the Santiago Network on loss and damage under the Paris Agreement within the funding arrangements in providing capacity-building, technical assistance, and facilitating learning and knowledge transfer. But several developing country colleagues (including from Timor-Leste and the Dominican Republic) pushed back on the suggestion by the TC representative from the United States that the Santiago Network could take on a broader coordination role by pointing to its narrow technical mandate and its unsuitability to coordinate larger financial flows.
The issue of accountability and authority with respect to new funding arrangements also has implications for the nature and strength of the recommendations (as well as their specificity related to different aspects of TC’s mandate, specifically on issues related to paragraph 5 of the COP27 decisions) that the TC can forward to the COP28. While anticipated as a discussion point under the Co-Chairs’ scenario, the TC in Bonn did not yet discuss the format or specific content of the TC recommendations, although given time constraints in the process it is expected that some draft recommendations will have to be discussed at the next TC meeting at the end of August. The TC as a process authorized by the COP and CMA does not have the legal standing to mandate bodies outside of the UNFCCC (as acknowledged by several TC members, including from Egypt and the United States), and thus TC recommendations to those entities would be in a very weak form and phrased as an invitation or encouragement – to be taken up for consideration or to be ignored (as was the case with respect to the invitation by COP27 to international financial institutions to discuss ways to expand their financial provision relevant for loss and damage at the IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings in April). While the TC can make recommendations that could signal opportunities for improvement and reform in the activities of actors to provide new funding in response to loss and damage (such as through creating more fiscal space for developing countries through debt restructuring or debt deferment clauses or speeding up response to extreme events through pre-arranged or anticipatory financing), it cannot compel entities outside of the UNFCCC to act on these. By comparison, the TC can give specific mandates to bodies such as the Warsaw International Mechanism and the Santiago Network under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. This should be reflected through a differentiated level of detail and granularity with respect to recommendations for a new fund under the UNFCCC, other bodies under the UNFCCC and those actors relevant for new funding arrangements outside of the UNFCCC. Specifically as part of its recommendations to the COP28 the TC should detail the new fund’s proposed governing instrument and as well as initial guidance to the fund in sufficient detail for the COP/CMA to operationalize the fund with a decision at COP28. Applicable precedent was with decision 3/CP.17 at COP17 launching the GCF by describing in detail core mandates and function of the GCF and approving its annexed governing instrument. After a COP28 decision, more specific operational modalities and policies would then be elaborated by the fund’s board, including over the years of operation in response to receiving further annual guidance by the COP/CMA.
As mandated, the Bonn TC meeting also focused on identifying and expanding sources of funding for responding to loss and damage, including in response to the Co-Chairs’ guiding questions on funding gaps with respect to existing sources of finance at all levels, the potential of alternative or innovative sources of financing, and ways to blend public and private finance, such as for insurance-based approaches.
Developed country TC members from the United States, Norway, France, Australia and Ireland in their interventions stressed the need to look at funding resources from the widest possible range of sources such as public, private, and philanthropic and alternative sources of finance, including taxies and levies based on the polluter pays principle and proceeds from carbon markets in response to acknowledging unmet needs as well as being realistic about limits to developed countries’ ability to provide sufficient support. Several stressed the need to look beyond the ‘usual contributors’ and ask all parties in a capacity to do so to contribute irrespective of their status as developing countries under the UNFCCC and suggested that the principle of CBDR should not apply to sourcing funding for loss and damage (Ireland, United States and Norway). They suggested looking at proceeds from both the voluntary carbon markets (United States), including pricing mechanisms on maritime transport, as well as potentially from the Paris Agreement’s Article 6 carbon market mechanism (Norway), under which the Adaptation Fund is already set to receive a 5 percent share of proceeds.
Developing country TC members highlighted main funding gaps for rehabilitation and reconstruction from extreme and slow events (Maldives, Egypt), with the TC representative from Maldives reiterating a call for comprehensive debt restructuring and relief and pointing out that due to their complexity and limited scale debt-for-climate swaps are not the solution. They stressed that the fund should be resourced primarily through direct and grant-based contributions from developed countries (Egypt, Venezuela), but also consider a role for special drawing rights (Maldives and Egypt). In their view, principles of equity and CBDR should not only apply to direct contributions to the fund but also when considering innovative and alternative sources, such as levies and taxies to ensure that they have no negative impacts on developing countries and respect the fiscal sovereignty of states (Egypt and Venezuela), even though countries could be encouraged to enshrine the polluter-pays principle in their respective national laws (Antigua and Barbuda). The concern about not adding burden through levies and taxes on the poorest and most vulnerable was echoed by the French TC member. In their intervention, civil society representatives also emphasized that while the primary input to the fund should come from developed country parties to as public grant resources, the fund should also receive inputs from other sources, including alternative sources of finance - that meet the principles of fairness, predictability, redistribution, are public-based and based on a polluter pays principle - to supplement core public contributions.
The discussion on sources followed a presentation on the first day of the TC meeting of a synthesis report compiled by the TC’s Technical Support Unit (TSU) on existing funding arrangements and innovative sources relevant to addressing loss and damage. While it detailed a number of already established financing approaches and mechanisms, many of these provide either humanitarian or emergency assistance or funding for adaptation measures (such as climate information and early warning services) and thus no new and additional finance for addressing loss and damage. The report in detailing insurance and risk pooling approaches also critically raised issues linked to cost and ability to pay for insurance premiums and limits to insurance pay outs and overall insurance approaches.
Complementarity and coherence
The issue of complementarity and coherence of both new and existing funding arrangements is fundamentally linked to how new funding arrangements are defined (and the extent they build on or revise existing funding arrangements); the role of the new fund and its scope and scale; whether respective bodies or actors have the legitimacy and/or the authority to issue and enforce contractual obligation to ensure coordination and complementarity of supported actions both on the global level but also within recipient countries, for example through strong memoranda of understandings between different collaboration partners; and whether a potential coordinating body or mechanism would sit inside or outside the UNFCCC. With many of these issues still unresolved, the TC in its remaining two meetings will be hard pressed to answer the call of the TC representative from the United Arab Emirates speaking on behalf of the incoming COP28 Presidency, who had urged her fellow TC members at the start of the Bonn meeting to advance recommendations to COP28 that highlight complementarity and coherence between new and existing funding agreements with an adequate level of detail and building on some areas of convergence so that they can be adopted smoothly.
In the relatively condensed discussion in Bonn, TC members wondered to what extent possible TC recommendations on this mandate could be based on principles, such as suggested by the Australian representative that within the ‘mosaic’ of actors and funding arrangements duplication should be avoided with complementarity and coherence maximized to increase efficiency. The TC members from Timor-Leste and Egypt also stressed that the issue of complementarity and coherence is inextricably linked to core recommendations on institutional arrangements, especially for the new fund, which should play the major role in addressing funding gaps in scale and speed. Several TC members (including from Denmark) stressed that there are different levels and layers on coordination, including through the creation and strengthening of national-level loss and damage focal points or coordinating mechanisms (Timor-Leste, Antigua and Barbuda). There is also some experience to build on with existing language under the GCF governing instrument on complementarity and coherence, showcasing how the mandate could be addressed in an LDF governing instrument, although for the LDF and the context of loss and damage much stronger language and a contractual agreement with other players in the broader funding arrangement landscape that create obligations would be needed (Antigua and Barbuda).
Participation and procedures
A number of procedural issues related to the TC process and how they were taken up at the Bonn TC meeting deserve mention. One issue has been the participation and opportunities for engagement for stakeholders from civil society and in particular from local communities and population groups disproportionally affected by already devastating losses and damages, including women, Indigenous Peoples, youth or people living with disabilities throughout the TC process. While the TC meetings are open to the in-person participation of a limited number of stakeholders per recognized UNFCCC observer group and meetings are webcast (although not allowing for virtual inputs), civil society groups are pushing for further improvements, for example adding civil society technical experts to the TSU or reflecting and hearing more directly the voices of affected communities and people in the relevant workshops and discussion fora, including through more regional and national consultation and engagement by the TC Secretariat, the TC Co-Chairs and TC members, such as in the context of regional climate weeks.
In Bonn, in contrast to the first TC meeting, representatives of observer organizations were allowed in the meeting room, and thus had the opportunity to intervene repeatedly and on various agenda items. This was in addition to a designated session at the beginning of the TC meeting which allowed for a direct exchange of views between observer constituencies and TC members on a set of guiding questions proposed by the Co-Chairs, in which CSO representatives discussed detailed proposals for ensuring local communities have access to the new funding arrangements and the fund, including through a proposed direct access small grant funding window under the LDF, inclusion of community representatives in fund governance, and establishment of participatory loss and damage coordinating mechanisms at the country level to ensure funding provided is targeting the needs and priorities of local communities and marginalized groups and is supporting and protecting their rights.
A second issue related to the efforts to clarify the need for further work by the secretariat and the TSU to facilitate the work of the TC, with the Co-Chairs collecting a number of issues and discussing the option of the TSU working on and addressing some of those questions, for example in webinars for TC members before the third TC meeting. Some of the issues mentioned with respect to the fund included a better understanding of the legal personality of the fund, the possibility of transitional or interim arrangements, further clarity on legal matters and modalities for direct budget support and best practice lessons learned on local level community funding access or a review of triggers for funding release following different loss and damage events. With respect to defining elements of the new funding arrangements, further clarifying work might focus on the legal status of funding arrangements, options and requirements for reporting to the COP/CMA, as well as the possible contractual relationship between the fund and funding arrangements.
The Co-Chairs also shared with TC members as an internal, non-public document a summary of emerging views that they compiled as an internal document that will serve as foundation for further discussions at the third TC meeting end of August. They tried to appease concerns from both developed and developing country TC members that the summary document might not reflect their points completely or accurately by indicating its evolutionary and non-exhaustive nature.
While last year’s first Glasgow Dialogue was conducted at the UNFCCC Bonn intersessional in the absence of the COP/CMA decisions from COP27 that established a new fund and new funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage and thus did not provide targeted discussions, this year’s second Glasgow Dialogue was given a specific mandate under decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4 to focus on the operationalization of the new funding arrangements and the fund in their discussions with the expectation that these will inform the work of the TC going forward. The chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) is tasked to provide a summary report on the second Glasgow Dialogue within four weeks.
In Bonn, a much larger number of parties and non-party stakeholders than is represented in the TC meetings had an opportunity to exchange and discuss, thus strengthening the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the TC process and its mandate by reflecting more diversified inputs. Participants discussed in plenary and break out sessions some highly complex and specific questions, providing their thoughts on what characteristics would enable the new funding arrangements and fund to provide funding support for the different phases of addressing loss and damage in an effective way, including specifically in providing support in the different phases of responding to loss and damage associated with extreme weather events (preparedness, response, recovery, rehabilitation, reconstruction); on whether there are unique features for financing efforts for responding to loss and damage associated with slow onset events, or losses that are ‘non-economic’ in nature; and asking different institutional actors and stakeholder groups for specific ways in which they could contribute to maximize support from the existing funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage as well as their key limitations and barriers. As in the TC meeting just days earlier, developing and developed country parties in their interventions in the plenary indicated largely competing visions for the respective role, scale, and scope of the new fund and new funding arrangements, as well as in particular the role, scale, and scope of developed countries’ financial contributions in support of the evolving loss and damage finance landscape.
With the Bonn TC meeting, and subsequent discussions as part of the second Glasgow Dialogue during the UNFCCC 58th meeting of the subsidiary bodies (SB58) completed, next up is a second mandated workshop on loss and damage to be held in Bangkok, Thailand, on July 15 and 16. The first mandated workshop was held at the end of April and TC members in Bonn discussed and took note of the summary report on the findings of the workshop, including highlighting the value of the case studies presented there. The Bangkok workshop, which will be in a hybrid format, will be followed by the third TC meeting from August 29 to September 1. It is expected that TC members at their third meeting will elaborate a first draft of proposed recommendations to be delivered at COP28. A ministerial meeting to be convened by the incoming COP28 Presidency in the fall could provide some high level political guidance on how differing views could be reconciled for a possible convergence towards a set of recommendations that the fourth and last TC meeting (tentatively scheduled for October 17 to 20) will have to approve by consensus in order to forward these recommendations, including on operationalizating the fund, to the climate summit in Dubai for a decision.