The following article is based on a closed workshop of the Iran Advisory Group, a joint project between the Heinrich Boell Foundation and the Stimson Center. The arguments made by the conference participants are paraphrased and anonymized, as the meeting took place under Chatham House rules.
Domestic Rivalries: Challenging the Ideology of Resistance
The political rivalry inside Iran’s regime, which has heated up over the course of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, largely plays out between two camps: The first camp is built on the ideology of resistance, and sees Iran as part of an Axis of Resistance with Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and to some extent Gaza and Russia. The second camp, including Rouhani and Zarif, wants to go beyond the ideology of resistance and translate Iran’s foreign policy opening into domestic successes by revitalizing the economy and allowing limited political reform. This in turn would help Rouhani domestically to win the next round of elections. In the foreseeable future, the likely outcome of the struggle between these two camps will be a combination of the two- a dynamic which will ultimately strengthen the regime as a whole.
Since his election victory, President Rouhani has suffered several setbacks domestically, which have resulted in a substantial decline of his appeal to the Iranian public. Contrary to the expectations of his proponents, he has failed to implement the Charter on Citizens’ rights or to push forward the release of leading voices of the Green Movement. Further, despite his electoral promise, Iran has not appointed any female minister hitherto. Much to the disappointment of Iran’s Sunni population, President Rouhani has also failed to address the grievances of the country’s minorities.
As positive domestic developments are stagnating, President Rouhani has put a lot of emphasis on a nuclear deal, framing it as a remedy to Iran’s economic malaise and international isolation. While the hardliners’ political focus is directed at regional issues, President Rouhani’s first priority is the conclusion of a nuclear agreement, which he eventually wants to link to regional political dynamics. However, he faces a strong conservative block in Parliament and other institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary, senior conservative clerics as well as conservative media outlets.
In principle, the Supreme Leader has given Rouhani a green light to compromise on a deal, which distinguishes him from the nuclear hardliners in Iran. While Khamenei is cautiously supportive of the nuclear negotiations, he insists that a deal should not be struck at any price and prefers an outcome perceived as a limited success for Rouhani and Zarif. While the intensity of the conservatives’ response will depend on the content of the deal, heavy public criticism is likely to follow. To limit Rouhani’s ability to benefit from a deal domestically, Iran’s conservative block will make sure to negate his claim for victory.
In the Supreme Leader’s view, the nuclear deal should not be tied to concessions on other regional issues. In order to minimize President Rouhani’s leverage, Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards will focus on several theatres of conflict: In Syria, they will continue to pursue the survival of the Assad regime, which has substantial value for Iran’s domestic politics. In Iraq, the rise of ISIS strengthens their position, as it serves Iran’s narrative claiming that the removal of governments in the region by the U.S. will help the rise of extremist groups to power. In Gaza, the hardliners will continue to support Hamas politically and militarily as part of the axis of resistance. In Yemen, the hardliners now take credit for having supported the Shia insurgency, also known as the Houthi rebellion, which now largely controls Sana’a. All in all, Tehran can now claim considerable influence or even control of four capitals in the Middle East, ranging from Baghdad, to Damascus, to Beirut and Sana’a.
Iran’s Influence in the Region: National Priorities
Considering the growing ISIS threat, the support of the Assad regime is particularly crucial for Iranian conservatives and hardliners in order to guarantee their grip on the Shia crescent all the way to the Mediterranean. However, given Maliki’s forced exit, some argue that it has now become conceivable for Iran to eventually agree to “throw Assad under the bus”, as long as Iran is part of the negotiations on the day after arrangement. Should Assad be indeed forced out of Syria eventually, the strategic value of Iraq for Iran will rise significantly in order to maintain its political influence in the region.
While Iran has considerable influence in Iraq, the degree varies significantly: On the clerical level, Najaf is an area dominated by Grand Ayatolla Ali al-Sistani, largely limiting Teheran’s influence. Karbala, in contrast, is dominated by people believing in Wilayat Al Faqih with strong ties to Iran’s regime. On the political level, Iraq’s Shi’a political parties are strongly influenced by Tehran. Influence on the Iraqi population is considerably weaker, though Iran has a strong foothold in Kurdistan, especially through its alliance with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Generally, Iraqi Shi’a perceive Iran as the only neighbor from which no danger emerges, in contrast to Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In sum, it is important to understand the nuances of Iranian influence, depending on the specific issue, region and even city.
While Iran is not interested in officially joining the coalition against ISIS, there is still a convergence of interest between the U.S. and Iran to achieve ISIS’s defeat. Although there might not be an official cooperation on this and other regional conflicts even after a successful conclusion of a nuclear deal, Iran and the U.S. might attempt to pursue their common goals on parallel tracks. Such a parallel approach was already taken by the U.S. and Iran in the past, e.g. when fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan or while breaking the siege of the city of Armili in Iraq. Other examples that illustrate the pragmatist foreign policy approach of the Rouhani administration include the willingness to force Maliki out in Iraq, turning a blind eye to the U.S. bombing campaign of ISIS, and providing arms to the Lebanese army rather than only to Hezbollah.
What does a nuclear Deal mean for the Middle East?
Regional assessments of likely effects of a nuclear deal on Iran’s stance in the region vary. Some argue that a nuclear deal would considerably strengthen Iran’s role in the Middle East, and would boost its role as a confident middle power. According to this line of argumentation, it would symbolize a diplomatic victory for Iran, which has already won a range of military victories in recent years, mainly by arming and training militias. Others argue, however, that the major concerns in most of the Arab world no longer revolve around the successful negotiation of a deal. According to this perspective, the state of panic in many Arab capitals in the wake of a possible nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 has decreased considerably since last year. Instead, the breakdown of the regional order and the rise of expansionist and extremist Sunni groups are now perceived as a much more urgent security threat to confront.
From a Saudi perspective, a nuclear deal would merely be a diplomatic victory in an era where Iran can already pride itself with several military victories. In terms of the actual balance of power, it would strengthen Iran’s influence in the region, increasing the sense of encirclement in Saudi Arabia. The Syria question therefore constitutes an issue of vital strategic importance: If Saudi Arabia manages to claim influence over Syria, this would symbolize a considerable loss of Shi’a dominance in the region.
Regardless of the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran will remain problematic for several reasons: Besides the countries’ opposing stance on Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, many historical and structural differences define the countries’ hostile relationship, making any strategic cooperation unlikely. In any case, it is important to realize the limits of prospects for Iran-Saudi cooperation. Especially given the increasing influence of non-state actors in the region, the ability of states to reduce sectarianism has significantly declined. Even if Iran and Saudi Arabia reach a détente, entrenched sectarianism would remain. As long as political and economic disenfranchisement continues, sectarianism will continue to play a destructive role in the region.
Limits to Iranian Power in the Middle East
Despite the general perception of Iran being an ascendant power in the region, no broad and enduring regional coalitions seem to appear as a counterweight. Instead, regional coalitions continue to be formed on tactical rather than strategic ground. Both the Anti- ISIS coalition between the Gulf States and Jordan, as well as the Anti-Hamas and Anti-Muslim Brotherhood coalition which erupted after the Gaza war serve as a case in point. While these two coalitions largely overlap (with the exception of Qatar), no broad and effective regional coalition is likely to develop as a counterweight to Iran in the foreseeable future. One defining characteristic of most of the members of either coalition, however, is the narrowing political space and increasing authoritarianism, e.g. by issuing anti-terrorism laws and conflating the ISIS threat to enforce regime control.
Overall, the catastrophic events since the capture of Mosul by ISIS show how limited Iran’s ability is to manage the regional conflicts unilaterally. Given the magnitude of the security threat stemming from the breakdown of the old regional order, no one state can control the outcome of the various conflicts alone. The fact that neither the Syrian government nor the opposition to Assad can claim all of Syria with a ground offensive illustrates that Iran depends on partnerships with other governments. Moving forward, it will be important for all regional parties to realize their limitations. The only way to put out the fire in the Middle East is to increase regional cooperation.